First of all, it is clear from multiple quotes that Inspiring Philosophy has affirmed subjective idealism (the view that our thoughts and perceptions held in conscious experience are all that exist.):
"A reality independent of observation doesn't exist."
"The existence of reality is dependent on there being an observer.""Reality is a mental construct, and doesn't exist independent of observation."
"Materialism would be that the universe is the only thing that exists and consciousness is an illusion of it. Idealism would be the opposite." (Notice that he is literally saying here that consciousness is the only thing in existence).
And it is also clear that he has contradicted this position several times:
"Independent of observation, particles exist in a state of a wave function"
"Of course something exists prior to observation. We would argue that would be information."
"Without an observer there is no qualia, but the information waiting to be loaded."
"memories or thoughts exist even when I am not perceiving them"
"I have never in definition identified as a monistic idealist in the strong sense" (By "strong sense", he is referring to subjective idealism.)
Inspiring Philosophy, Johanan Raatz, derezzed83, Animating Rebel, and all of Raatz's minions constantly use the term "information". Animating Rebel and derezzed83 prefer to simply leave the term undefined, which instantly exposes their empty position. Inspiring Philosophy and Raatz have been forced to offer definitions due to my persistent questioning. They have offered three basic definitions that are, of course, completely inconsistent:
1. Information is the semantic content of a sentence. I have already shown that this definition makes most of their claims regarding information incoherent.
2. Information is sense experience. Well, if that's the case, then why even call it information? This isn't what people ordinarily mean by information, so you're just being deliberately confusing for the sake of sounding computery. This also directly contradicts Inspiring Philosophy's claim that information exists prior to observation. 3. Information is the fundamental nature of reality. This is just hopelessly vague. And again, there is no need to call this stuff "information". It's not like that's what comes to anyone's mind when they think of information.
Inspiring Philosophy has taken numerous positions regarding information:
"Information itself, is contingent by definition. So it must be dependent on something."
Which is contradicted by -
"all reality is information"
He has also said that mind cannot exist without information:
"mind/consciousness has elements of interpreted information and cannot be without it."
And that mind can exist without information:
"The mind could exist without information."
As for what specific things Inspiring Philosophy considers to be information, so far his list includes qualia, personalities, memories, and unobserved physical objects (how he can even allow for unobserved physical objects is a mystery, since he has also claimed that the physical world is only qualia).
Then there's this quote from Inspiring Philosophy. I really have no idea how he thinks this makes sense:
"As an idealist of course consciousness is not independent of the brain."
And, regarding the "objective idealist" philosophers (Kant, Hegel, and Putnam) that Inspiring Philosophy tried to associate himself with:
Kant obviously disagreed with Inspiring Philosophy because he believed in the noumena, which is the objectively real world of "things-in-themselves" that exists beyond our perceptions.
Hegel's philosophy is obscured by a thick veil of indiscernible nonsense (or it might just be indiscernible nonsense), but the following sentence from SEP seems to conflict with Inspiring Philosophy: "The pantheistic legacy inherited by Hegel meant that he had no problem in considering an objective outer world beyond any particular subjective mind."
Putnam's internal realism has been criticized for being somewhat retarded, but there are also quotes that indicate it is inconsistent with Inspiring Philosophy's position: "I am not inclined to scoff at the idea of a noumenal ground behind the dualities of experience, even if all attempts to talk about it lead to antinomies", and "Today the notion of a noumenal world is perceived to be an unnecessary metaphysical element in Kant's thought. (But perhaps Kant is right: perhaps we can't help thinking that there is somehow a mind-independent 'ground' for our experience even if attempts to talk about it lead at once to nonsense.)"
